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Three recent Supreme Court cases addressed the split jurisdiction between state and federal regulation of the electric grid. Joel Eisen, a professor at the University of Richmond
School of Law, examines the impact of these cases on the rapidly changing energy sector.

The Supreme Court’s New Electricity Federalism
JOEL B. EISEN
n a remarkable burst of activity, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided three cases in the past year involving
the split of jurisdiction between the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the states in the
energy sector. FERC v. Electric Power Supply Association and Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing dealt with
the relationship between FERC and the states in governing the electric grid under the Federal Power Act
(FPA). ONEOK v. Learjet involved regulation of natural
gas pipelines under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), which,
being nearly identical to the FPA, also serves as precedent for decisions involving the electric grid.
The impacts of these decisions will reverberate for
years to come. They mark the end of ‘‘dual federalism’’
in electricity law that treated federal and state regulators as operating within separate and distinct spheres of
authority, recognizing instead that state and federal initiatives frequently overlap. The Court has provided
standards to govern the interaction between FERC and
the states going forward, but has also left considerable
uncertainty. Thus, these watershed decisions herald a
new legal approach to governing the rapid evolution of
the modern electric grid, but one in which the precise
contours will not be known for some time.
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This transformative change in electricity law reflects
the tectonic shift occurring today in the electric grid.
For over six decades after the FPA’s enactment in 1935,
the nation’s system of making electricity and delivering
it to customers was stable and predictable. The nation’s
major utilities were vertically integrated monopolies,
much as the phone system once was. Utilities generated
electricity in their power plants, moved it across their
transmission wires, and delivered it to their customers.
State public utility commissions regulated utilities’
rates and services to guard against the ills of monopolization.
In the grid of 1935, federal jurisdiction could be
fenced off at a state border. This bright line was typical
of the early 20th century’s dual federalism, which posited that federal and state regulatory authority could be
separated neatly into exclusive spheres. In today’s interconnected electricity network, this no longer makes
sense. A system of shared responsibility is more appropriate than a jurisdictional bright line, because both the
states and FERC are taking actions simultaneously to
influence such matters as how many power plants get
built and how much renewable energy is added to the
grid. In this new environment, many state or federal actions can simultaneously have impacts on both retail
electricity rates and wholesale markets.

Rapidly Changing Electric Grid.
Now, there is change everywhere. Solar and wind
power are being rapidly added to the grid. This power
is generated at the edge of the grid in places like residential rooftops and remote wind farms, rather than in
central power stations. It requires new transmission
lines, grid connections and advanced management of
increasingly diverse sources of power on the grid to
protect its reliability. New business models, technologies and upstart competitors, such as solar leasing
firms, are challenging traditional utilities. The utilities
face a challenging environment in which they may
eventually lose customers and perhaps even their longprotected profitability.
BNA
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Debates in well over two dozen states over charges
related to net metering and solar demand highlight
these impacts of the industry shift.
Even more dramatic transformations are on the horizon. Potential game changers like battery storage and
‘‘microgrids’’ (self-sustaining areas largely disconnected from the traditional grid) abound. If storage becomes more widely available and less expensive than
Tesla’s ‘‘Power Wall,’’ consumers could keep the power
they make from solar panels and provide it back to the
grid when it would be most advantageous for them to
do so. Not far off in the future, electricity may even be
traded among ‘‘prosumers’’ rather than simply purchased by consumers. Recognizing this, California and
New York are experimenting with overhauling the entire system in which electricity is distributed to customers. The watchword is change, and more of it is promised.
The grid’s architecture has also changed dramatically. The regional wholesale markets that now trade
over two-thirds of the nation’s electricity under FERC
oversight have been in existence for only fifteen years.
And, as a result of the restructuring (partial deregulation) of the 1990s, another major change took place at
the retail level. Consumers in sixteen states and the District of Columbia can choose to have their electricity delivered by suppliers other than their utilities. In Maryland, where the events leading to Hughes took place,
roughly one-fourth of all residential customers are
served in this fashion.

Altering the Jurisdictional Boundaries.
The result is a complex and diverse system of electricity generation, transmission and delivery that is
evolving rapidly. The FPA’s drafters would have considerable difficulty recognizing today’s grid. The statute’s
core provisions, however, are virtually unchanged since
1935, when FDR was a year away from trouncing Alf
Landon, the number one movie was Clark Gable’s Mutiny on the Bounty, and a pound of sugar cost five cents.
Under the FPA, FERC regulates the transmission of
electricity in interstate commerce and rates, terms and
conditions of wholesale sales (any sales that are for resale, that is, not to an eventual consumer). It also has
the power to order a remedy if it finds a ‘‘rule, regulation, practice or contract affecting such [wholesale]
rate’’ to be ‘‘unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential.’’ The states regulate retail sales to
end users, siting of power plants and transmission lines,
and other matters. This jurisdictional divide between
‘‘wholesale’’ and ‘‘retail’’ reflected congressional intent
to close the ‘‘Attleboro gap,’’ named for the 1927 Supreme Court decision that proclaimed that the federal
government regulated sales of electricity that crossed
state lines.
Given this split, the 80-year-old FPA framework still
appears to call for FERC and the states to operate independently. In this formalistic reading, it is the last vestige of dual federalism, which is gone from the national
scene in other regulated industries. A modern example
of the shift is environmental law’s ‘‘cooperative federalism,’’ where states and the EPA share responsibility for
implementing environmental laws. The FPA’s bright
line is inappropriate as a jurisdictional test in the modern grid, and a system of shared, or concurrent federalism, would be more useful. If designed properly, it
5-20-16

would minimize jurisdictional disputes while promoting
federal and state initiatives for innovating on the grid,
protecting reliability and other attributes.
The Supreme Court, however, cannot act simply because a statute may seem outmoded and ineffective to
deal with today’s realities. Without congressional action, of course, the Court could not change the FPA’s
text. Nor could it render an advisory opinion to reinterpret the FPA. Under the Constitution, there must be a
case or controversy that the Court can hear. Even that
is no guarantee that the case will find its way to the Supreme Court, which controls its docket and takes few of
the cases presented to it. Usually, the Court takes cases
where two or more federal appellate courts have split
on the issues. Hughes featured no circuit split, for two
lower courts agreed about the FPA’s reach. Nor did
FERC v. EPSA, which originated in the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, and ONEOK, which involved a Ninth
Circuit decision without any corresponding decision of
another circuit.
In the absence of a circuit split, the Court often
chooses cases it believes are of utmost national
importance—for example, the Texas challenge to President Barack Obama’s immigration actions currently before the Court. Here, the Court felt compelled to tackle
three cases that squarely presented variations on the
question introduced above: Which level of government
controls the transition underway in the electric grid? Inevitably, given the concurrent actions by both levels of
government, conflicts were bound to— and did—arise.
The Court’s decisions addressed these conflicts and
aimed to allocate responsibility for decisions affecting
the grid going forward, within the limitations of statutory language written many years ago.

Impacts of FERC Supreme Court Rulings.
The first of the three decisions was 2015’s ONEOK v.
Learjet, in which Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority
opinion held that the NGA did not preempt actions
taken under state antitrust laws to recover damages for
manipulation of the natural gas market. Natural gas
purchasers claimed that they had been overcharged due
to pipelines’ manipulation that affected prices in both
wholesale and retail markets. The Court was therefore
forced to choose whether FERC or state courts held
sway. Justice Breyer rejected the argument that FERC
had exclusive authority to protect pipeline customers
because ‘‘practices’’ affecting wholesale rates for natural gas (in this case, the manipulative activities that
raised prices) were exclusively within FERC’s jurisdiction. Instead, he wrote, preemption of state laws must
be determined with reference to ‘‘the target at which
the state law aims in determining whether [the] law is
pre-empted.’’ Because the antitrust laws govern a wide
variety of industries, and not just natural gas pipelines,
the state lawsuits would stand. If, however, the Court
had been presented with a state law that ‘‘aimed directly at the wholesale markets,’’ the NGA would have
preempted it. There was no further elaboration of what
types of state laws ‘‘aim directly’’ at the wholesale markets, and more guidance would come later in Hughes.
In FERC v. EPSA, Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a
six-justice majority, upheld a FERC rule requiring that
regional grid operators compensate aggregated bids of
‘‘demand response’’ (reductions in electricity consumption in response to grid emergencies or price signals) at
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the same wholesale market price paid to generators in
the wholesale energy markets. In its rule, FERC recognized that using demand-side measures to reduce peak
stress on the grid can help balance supply and demand,
improve reliability and decrease peak electricity prices.
In the D.C. Circuit, the association representing power
producers had argued successfully that FERC did not
have authority under the FPA to make this rule, and
that demand response was wholly within state jurisdiction because it affected end users.
The Court reversed this decision. It confirmed
FERC’s authority over ‘‘practices’’ affecting wholesale
rates for electricity, stated that demand response was
such a practice, and upheld FERC’s rule. It rejected the
argument that demand response was exclusively a state
matter, finding that adding it to wholesale markets impacted prices in those markets, and that even if its policies would have impacts on the states and retail electricity rates, FERC was not foreclosed from acting. The
Court did mention its ‘‘notable solicitude’’ for state demand response programs, and also added that FERC’s
rule allowed a state government to bar firms within its
borders from taking part in wholesale energy markets.
The Court articulated a standard for upholding FERC
initiatives such as this rule: FERC can regulate practices
if wholesale rates are ‘‘directly’’ affected. To the Court,
the demand response rule was a prime example of this
because injecting demand reductions into wholesale
markets immediately impacts wholesale prices. As
opaque as this new test may appear, it has solid grounding in over 100 years of doctrine dating to the federal
regulation of railroads in the early 20th century. And
this decision’s grant of authority, coupled with the wellrecognized limitation that FERC’s initiatives have a ‘‘direct’’ impact on wholesale rates that it sets, yields a
clearer picture of FERC’s role in a system of concurrent
jurisdiction.
Indeed, FERC v. EPSA has enormous implications going forward, as it gives FERC considerable leeway to
regulate matters affecting the wholesale markets. Consider two examples of how boldly FERC could use its
‘‘directly affecting’’ authority to craft policies for integrating clean and renewable energy into the electric
grid, with environmental benefits such as reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. The first involves a program
that California’s regional grid operator has proposed to
integrate distributed energy resources (DERs) into
wholesale markets. ‘‘DERs’’ are the small-scale resources on the customer side of the electric system,
such as rooftop solar, energy storage, plug-in electric
vehicles and demand response. At present, a rooftop solar owner could not bid his excess electricity into a
wholesale market due to size limits on market participants and other restrictions. Under the California ‘‘micro aggregation’’ proposal, this would change. Firms
acting as ‘‘distributed energy resource providers’’
would aggregate mixtures of resources and sell them
into the wholesale markets. This could dramatically expand the amount of DERs in the California wholesale
markets and create an entire new class of participants
in the grid. A wide variety of firms—electric vehicle
charging stations, demand response companies, home
automation firms and partnerships between battery
storage and solar leasing companies—have expressed
interest in the California proposal.
California consumers would participate directly in
the wholesale markets through these intermediaries,
DAILY ENVIRONMENT REPORT
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like the consumers in FERC v. EPSA who bid demand
reductions into wholesale markets. Suppose that after
California gained experience with this program, FERC
believed it was successful and issued a rule that expanded it to other regions. Bids of DERs would directly
impact wholesale rates: Adding new resources to a regional electricity mix would change prices, much as demand response lowered prices directly at times of peak
demand. For that reason, FERC would almost certainly
be acting properly under the new ‘‘directly affecting’’
standard if it expanded DER aggregation. The potential
implications are staggering: In a multi-state region,
FERC could allow a consumer with excess solar power
to effectively sell it to consumers many miles away in a
different state.
FERC could influence an even more dramatic transformation contemplated by California and New York
(the latter in its ‘‘Reforming the Energy Vision’’ proceeding) that would establish ‘‘distribution system operators’’ (DSOs). These entities would fit between grid
operators and customers, and coordinate a wide variety
of activities, including the interface between DERs and
the transmission system, and potentially all dispatch
(determining which power generating units operate to
serve customers). This function might be handled by
existing utilities, as under certain iterations of the New
York proposal, or by new, independent entities. Any exchange of electricity between a grid operator and a
DSO would be a FERC-jurisdictional wholesale transaction, and FERC would have jurisdiction over other aspects of DSO operations under its ‘‘directly affecting’’
authority. In the long run, we might well see FERC
adopt an ‘‘open access distribution tariff’’ specifying
terms and conditions for this interaction, similar to the
open access tariffs that govern access to the nation’s
transmission lines.
One set of issues FERC v. EPSA left unaddressed involved how far the states could go in influencing the
grid’s future direction, when their actions might impact
the wholesale markets. This issue arose in Hughes in
the context of a Maryland law that provided incentives
for a new power plant to locate in the state. The state
tied its incentive to prices in the ‘‘capacity’’ market that
the PJM regional transmission organization, the grid
operator in the region that includes Maryland, has operated since 2007. Capacity markets came into existence when regional planners recognized that electricity market prices alone would not prompt construction
of new power plants. The PJM capacity market, for example, is designed to provide additional payments to
generators that commit to sell power into PJM over the
next three years.
Maryland officials believed these payments were insufficient to induce construction of new power plants in
the state. The resulting state law created a ‘‘contract for
differences’’ between the winning bidder and loadserving entities (LSEs, the term for utilities and retail
suppliers that serve customers). If the contract price exceeded the capacity market price, LSEs would pay the
difference to the plant owner. Because PJM already requires LSEs to purchase capacity for the demand they
serve, the LSEs could therefore pay a premium above
the market price. A group of challengers claimed this
interfered with pricing in the wholesale markets, and
the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. It found
that the doctrine of field preemption applied, concluding that FERC’s regulation of wholesale markets under
BNA
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the FPA is so all-encompassing that it leaves no room
for a state law.
As Hughes reached the Court, many observers believed that it would reject the lower court’s field preemption approach. If upheld, FERC would have power
to void all state initiatives that might impact the wholesale markets, no matter how substantial the impacts
and how legitimate the states’ goals might be. That is
too imbalanced and blunt an instrument to govern the
federal-state relationship. Some believed the Court
would adopt a ‘‘conflict preemption’’ approach, under
which a state law falls only if it conflicts with the intent
of the federal statute.
Instead, the Court avoided crafting a broad principle
that articulated which state initiatives would and would
not conflict with the FPA. It issued a narrow decision
that, like FERC v. EPSA, hewed closely to the statutory
text. The Court overturned the Maryland law because it
interfered with the system of setting wholesale rates
through the capacity auctions. The Maryland program
took the market payment as an input and gave the
power plant owner the ability to change it. It allowed
the owner to consider the subsidy and therefore bid differently into the market, which, the Court stated, would
distort the market design and ‘‘disregards’’ the wholesale rate. Notwithstanding the Court’s rote enunciation
of preemption principles, this decision was grounded
solely in an interpretation of the statute. This was evidenced in Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s concurring opinion stating that she agreed with the majority decision
on that basis.
The Court cautioned that it was only rejecting this
particular subsidy program:
Our holding is limited: We reject Maryland’s program only because it disregards an interstate
wholesale rate required by FERC. We therefore
need not and do not address the permissibility of
various other measures States might employ to encourage development of new or clean generation,
including tax incentives, land grants, direct subsidies, construction of state-owned generation facilities, or re-regulation of the energy sector. Nothing
in this opinion should be read to foreclose Maryland and other States from encouraging production of new or clean generation through measures
‘‘untethered to a generator’s wholesale market
participation.’’ So long as a State does not condition payment of funds on capacity clearing the auction, the State’s program would not suffer from the
fatal defect that renders Maryland’s program unacceptable.
This language, taken together with Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence and Justice Kagan’s ‘‘notable solicitude’’ for the states in FERC v. EPSA, demonstrates the
Court’s reluctance to fashion a sweeping jurisdictional
bright line. However, it leaves considerable uncertainty
about what state actions are now allowed. Any other
state incentive directly conditioned on expected market
revenues would be as suspect as the Maryland program
Hughes rejected, as the Court itself recognized shortly
thereafter in refusing to hear an appeal of a 3rd Circuit
decision voiding a similar New Jersey law.
What state incentives might survive judicial scrutiny?
Consider one recognized by the Court itself — a state’s
tax incentive. Suppose Maryland gave a power plant
owner a complete exemption from local property and
other taxes. If it tied the incentive to making up a short5-20-16

fall in market payments, this would likely be invalid. On
the other hand, if it did not do so, the incentive would
not be ‘‘tethered’’ (linked) to wholesale market participation (property taxes themselves do not ‘‘aim directly’’
at the market, in the language of ONEOK) and might be
permissible. But it might have the same market distorting impact as Maryland’s contract for differences
mechanism if it provided the same amount of savings.
The state could request that FERC approve the initiative, but that may not be likely if it impacts the wholesale markets. This example demonstrates that the laundry list of state initiatives the Court appears to endorse
probably raises more questions than it answers.

Several Conclusions From These Cases.
Prior to ONEOK, FERC v. EPSA and Hughes, more
than five years had elapsed since the Court had issued
any decision involving the electric grid, much less three
in the span of one year. Taken as a whole, several conclusions may be drawn from these cases. First, FERC
has sweeping authority to transform the electric grid
under the ‘‘directly affecting’’ test, subject to certain
limitations. The states can take actions under broadbased statutes, such as antitrust and tax laws, and can
pursue their own energy goals as long as their initiatives do not directly target FERC-jurisdictional wholesale rates.
Second, these decisions mark the end of dual federalism in electricity law because it can no longer be said
that federal and state actions are disconnected. Instead,
the Court has recognized, in all three cases, that the two
levels of government are now interconnected for the
foreseeable future. FERC v. EPSA’s ‘‘directly affecting’’
standard and Hughes’ invalidation of the Maryland contract for differences give FERC authority while preserving latitude for states to act. Thus, both may act simultaneously even if it impacts the other: FERC may act
even if it impacts retail rates, and the states can act if
they don’t ‘‘disregard’’ wholesale rates.
Finally, the jurisdictional division of responsibility
between FERC and the states is now a matter of experimentation rather than a system governed by hard and
fast rules. While the Court has given FERC the green
light to act boldly, it is demonstrably uncomfortable
with sorting out all of the potential consequences for
the states. Hughes and ONEOK set overarching principles and allow for case-by-case determination of state
interference with the federal scheme, rather than aspiring to doctrinal precision. ‘‘Aiming at the wholesale
market,’’ ‘‘untethered to a generator’s wholesale market participation,’’ and ‘‘condition on participation in
the wholesale market’’ are words likely to guide federal
courts for years to come.
In the absence of yet another Supreme Court decision
clarifying its new positions on electricity federalism,
more guidance is not likely to be forthcoming. This language offers little predictability, and states will have to
either vet their statutory and regulatory initiatives with
FERC or run the risk of litigation. As Professor Emily
Hammond of the George Washington University Law
School recently observed, ‘‘The difficulty is that Hughes
doesn’t really tell us which state initiatives will survive
future Supremacy Clause challenges, and which will
fail. We are likely now in the position of awaiting ‘Take
Four.’ ’’ In states whose utilities do not participate in organized wholesale markets, of course, the principles of
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traditional electricity regulation will continue to apply
as before.
One conclusion implicit in all three of these decisions
is that there is no need for a new or revamped Federal
Power Act. While modern challenges seemed to have
stressed this venerable statute near its conceptual
breaking point, it has demonstrated its remarkable flexibility to handle today’s challenges. Wisely, the Court
appears to recognize that the FPA governs a complex,
highly technical and rapidly evolving industry, that the
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Court lacks the expertise of federal and state regulators, and that it might make a serious misstep if it did
more to precisely define how the FPA should govern the
federal-state relationship going forward. But there has
been no suggestion that statutory overhaul is necessary.
On the contrary, the Court has relied explicitly on the
statutory text to address matters never foreseen in
1935. To the Court, the FPA remains a solid foundation
on which to build a robust, modern electric grid.
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